Curiosity-Aware Bargaining by Buron, Cédric et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
61
2.
09
43
3v
1 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 30
 D
ec
 20
16
Curiosity-Aware Bargaining
Ce´dric L.R. Buron ∗1,2, Sylvain Ductor2, and Zahia Guessoum2,3
1Kyriba, Saint Cloud, France
2Universite´ Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris, France
3Universite´ de Reims Champagne Ardennes
August 13, 2018
Abstract
Opponent modeling consists in modeling the strategy or prefer-
ences of an agent thanks to the data it provides. In the context of
automated negotiation and with machine learning, it can result in an
advantage so overwhelming that it may restrain some casual agents to
be part of the bargaining. We qualify as “curious” an agent driven by
the desire of negotiating in order to collect information and improve
its opponent model. However, neither curiosity-based rationality nor
curiosity-robust protocol have been studied in automatic negotiation.
In this paper, we rely on mechanism design to propose three extensions
of the standard bargaining protocol that limit information leak. Those
extensions are supported by an enhanced rationality model, that con-
siders the exchanged information. Also, they are theoretically analyzed
and experimentally evaluated.
Keywords: Automated Negotiation, Bargaining, Opponent Modeling,
Rationality, Mechanism Design, Curiosity
1 Introduction
Negotiation involves several parties that exchange proposals in order to reach
a mutually beneficial outcome. Each participant has private information and
a utility function that may be in conflict with other participants.
To get a good agreement for herself, a participant may choose to use
opponent modeling (see [3] for a survey on this topic). Opponent modeling
is based on machine learning techniques, which are fed by the sequences of
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exchanged proposals. It allows to learn the way the opponent values goods
([6, 19]), which provides a major advantage in the future negotiations ([20]).
Opponent modelers have therefore an incentive to pretend to negotiate
to get a good while they are seeking as much data as possible from their
opponent. Opponent modelers that act this way are called “curious”. Curi-
ous agents have a harmful influence on negotiations: collected information
provides them more efficient modelings, which will significantly unbalance
the future negotiations in their favor. Consequently, casual agents may be
discouraged and be reluctant to use the bargaining protocol.
In this paper, we design a protocol that extends the standard bargaining
in order to restrain the sphere of operation of curious agents. To do that,
we first present related work (Section 2) and model how the agents evalu-
ate exchanged information by extending the classical model of rationality
(Section 3). We then improve standard bargaining with three theoretically
analyzed extensions (Section 4). The first one prevents agents from initiat-
ing the negotiation if there is no chance to reach an agreement. The sec-
ond one directly limits the number of exchanged proposals. The third one
prohibits the agents from leaving the negotiation without agreement. The
significance of our proposed extensions is proved empirically (Section 5).
We finally summarize our proposal and give some possible extensions to our
work (Section 6).
2 Related Work
In bargaining [4], each party tries to reach a joint decision involving two
conflicting goals: maximizing the utility of an agreement and maximizing the
chance of acceptance by the opponent. Relevant tactics have been proposed
to achieve the first goal such as the efficient Tit-for-Tat [12].The second goal
requires skills such as curiosity to understand the opponents’ strategies and
preferences. Psychologists Fisher et al. [9] define the curiosity as the ability
to see the situation as the other side sees it.
In automated negotiation, this ability corresponds to what is called “op-
ponent modeling” [3]. We distinguish two approaches: on single session
(online) and on multi-session (offline).Among the work on single session
modeling, the most widely used techniques are Bayesian learning [11], non-
linear regression [13], and SVM [15]. Multi-session techniques include Kernel
Density Estimation [19] and neural networks [5]. The preponderance of this
approach is attested by the Automated Negotiation Agent Competition [1]
since all high ranking agents make a wide use of it [2].
The benefits of opponent modeling can lead to manipulative behavior
where agents try to get information at any cost. Also, the negotiation ends
up at the expense of the agents that do not mean to invest in this technique.
Bargaining being vulnerable to those behaviors, this protocol is disadvan-
tageous for the latters and therefore unreliable in general case. It is thus
necessary to develop a new bargaining framework resistant to those prac-
tices. Such a topic belongs to the theory of mechanism design.
Mechanism design [18, 16] studies the conception of “incentive-compatible”
mechanisms [14], i.e. protocols in which the agents act according to the
desire of the designer of the protocol. As an example, in the context of me-
diated bargaining1, several work (e.g. [17, 7]) give a theoretical framework
on how to design a protocol in which the agents provide their real reserve
prices to the mediator.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no work on mechanism design
related to standard (non-mediated) bargaining. In particular, there is no
attempt to design an extension of bargaining resistant to the aforementioned
problem.
3 Model of Curiosity-Aware Bargaining
We introduce in this section an original rationality model for bargaining.
Agents consider not only the price associated to the good but also the leaked
and collected information. We first introduce a model of the bargaining
protocol that explicitly represents this information. Then we extend the
two affected objects: the agent utility and the reserve price. Finally we
propose a classification of curiosity-aware agents.
3.1 Bargaining Model
Bargaining is a type of negotiation in which two agents, a purchaser p and
a seller s, seek mutual agreement on the price of a good. Each agent is
endowed with an agreement domain that induces, for the seller, the mini-
mum price it is willing to sell the good, and for the purchaser, the maximum
price it is willing to pay for it. Those values are called reserve prices ; an
agent has a null utility if the agreed price is exactly the reserve price, a
positive utility if it is better and a negative one if it is worse.
A bargaining proceeds with a a sequence of exchanged proposals
which respect the monotonic concession principle: in any two successive
proposals of an agent the second is always better for it opponent than the
first. A bargaining ends either by an accept or a reject by one of the
agents. The reject may be sent at any time to end the negotiation without
any transaction.
Definition 1 (Bargaining). A bargaining proceeds with exchange of propos-
als and ends with an accept or a reject of one of the participants. We note
1in mediated bargaining, the negotiators use a trusted third party called mediator. The
latter uses information delivered by the negotiators to generate the proposals.
V the space of lists of messages sent by one party during a bargaining.
V = {(k, p, e)|k ∈ N, p ∈ Rk, e ∈ {∅,⊤,⊥}} (1)
where
k ∈ N is the number of proposals
p ∈ Rk is the list of proposed prices
e ∈ {∅,⊤,⊥} is the ending message: either ⊤ if this party accepts the last
deal, ⊥ if it rejects it or ∅ if the other party ends the negotiation.
We note B the set of bargaining records. A bargaining b ∈ B is defined with
a six-tuple:
b = (gb, sb, pb, pib, ν
s
b , ν
p
b ) (2)
where
gb ∈ Good is the negotiated good,
sb, pb ∈ Agent
2 are respectively the seller and the purchaser identifiers
pib ∈ R
+ ∪ {⊥} is the negotiated price if the negotiation succeeds or ⊥ if it
fails.
νsb , ν
p
b ∈ V
2 are respectively the sequence of the seller and purchaser propos-
als.
3.2 Curiosity-Aware Utility & Reserve Price
In the classical rationality model used in bargaining, an agent is only inter-
ested in the final price of the good. A curiosity-aware agent is also interested
in the information exchanged during the bargaining process. This affects
both its utility model and its reserve price.
Definition 2 (Curiosity-Aware Utility). The utility of a curiosity-aware
agent is computed from the final price and the sequence of exchanges.
∀a ∈ Agent,∀b = (gb, sb, pb, pib, ν
s
b , ν
p
b
) ∈ B, ua : R× V × V → R
(pib, ν
s
b , ν
p
b
) 7→ ua(pib, ν
s
b , ν
p
b
)
(3)
The reserve price is the price for which the agent utility is null. Classical
agents have a constant reserve price throughout the negotiation, while the
reserve price of curiosity-aware agents is affected by the proposals made so
far.
Definition 3 (Curiosity-Aware Reserve Price). Let b be a bargaining. We
note pipb (k) ∈ R the reserve price of the purchaser at the intermediary step
k. It is defined by the following property:
∀b ∈ B,∀k ≤ kpb , up(pi
p
b (k), ν
s
\k, ν
p
\k) = 0 (4)
where kpb is the number of proposals made by purchaser p (see Definition 1),
ν
p
\k holds the k first proposals of the list ν
p and νs\k holds the k first proposals
of the list νs (if the seller made the first proposal, k − 1 else).
3.3 Agent Taxonomy
We now introduce three canonical types of agents that are characterized by
the way they value information and price. For the sake of simplicity, we rely
on comparators that are indifferently used for sellers and purchasers. For
Agent a:
≻pia and ∼
pi
a are respectively strict and equivalence orders over prices. A
seller prefers a higher price whereas a purchaser prefers a lower one.
≻νa and ∼
ν
a are respectively strict and equivalence orders over sequences of
proposals (i.e. V ). For two sequences of proposals ν and ν ′, ν ≻νa ν
′
means that agent a considers that ν carries more information than ν ′
In order to consistently extend the classical bargaining rationality model,
we assume that, any other thing being equal (ceteris paribus), any agent
prefers a bargaining resulting in a better price outcome. In other words,if
two bargainings reveal the same amount of information, an agent a prefers
the one that optimizes the price. The following equation is verified by any
rational agent:
∀b, b′ ∈ B2,


pib ≻
pi
a pib′
νsb ∼
ν
a ν
s
b′
ν
p
b
∼νa ν
p
b′
=⇒ ua(pib, ν
s
b , ν
p
b
) > ua(pib′ , ν
s
b′ , ν
p
b′
) (5)
Curiosity-aware agents may also consider both the leaked and revealed
information. An agent can be secretive or unsecretive depending on whether
or not it is concerned about the information it reveals. Also, an agent
can be curious or uncurious depending on whether or not it is interested
in the information it collects. Figure 1 presents examples of reserve price
functions for the three types of agents we detail below. They are drown
from Equation (10), used in our experiments.
An Uncurious (unsecretive) agent implements the classical under-
standing of rationality in bargaining: its sole interest is the final price.
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purchaser proposals
Figure 1: Proposals and reserve price of uncurious, curious and secretive
agents
Definition 4 (Uncurious Agent). An uncurious agent utility is not affected
by the exchanged information.
∀b, b′ ∈ B2, pib ≻
pi
a pib′ =⇒ ua(pib, ν
s
b , ν
p
b
) > ua(pib′ , ν
s
b′ , ν
p
b′
) (6)
A Secretive (uncurious) agent is aware that its actions reveal infor-
mation which can be used by malicious agents at its expense. It is however
only interested in selling/purchasing goods and not in collecting information
about other agents. The price it is willing to pay for a good decreases while
it is making proposals. Thus, it tends to drop the negotiation sooner than
a classical (uncurious) agent. Also, if the deal is not concluded, its utility is
negative since it reveals information and does not get any outcome.
Definition 5 (Secretive Agent). A secretive agent prefers not to reveal in-
formation, but is not interested by the collected information. In the case of
a purchaser p:
∀b, b′ ∈ B2,
{
pib ∼
pi
p pib′
ν
p
b′ ≻
ν
p ν
p
b
=⇒ up(pib, ν
s
b , ν
p
b
) > up(pib′ , ν
s
b′ , ν
p
b′
) (7)
A Curious (unsecretive) agent is interested in collecting information
that it may use for opponent modeling. It is not concerned about the infor-
mation it may reveal. The price it is willing to pay for a good increases when
the amount of collected information increases. It has a positive utility in
case of reject. A good strategy for such an agent is to make the bargaining
end as late as possible and to eventually reject it.
Definition 6 (Curious Agent). A curious agent aims collecting as much
information as possible during the exchange, but is not concerned by leaked
information. In the case of a purchaser p:
∀b, b′ ∈ B2,
{
pib ∼
pi
p pib′
νsb ≻
ν
p ν
s
b′
=⇒ up(pib, ν
s
b , ν
p
b
) > up(pib′ , ν
s
b′ , ν
p
b′
) (8)
A Curious and Secretive agent is both doing opponent modeling and
aiming to preserve itself from being modeled by other agents. It implements
Equation (9) which is a more constrained version of Equations (7) and (8)
(noted (7′) and (8′)). It is interested by either collecting more information
ceteris paribus, or revealing less information ceteris paribus. In the case of
a purchaser p:
∀b, b′ ∈ B2,
(7′)

pib ∼
pi
p pib′
νsb ∼
ν
p ν
s
b′
ν
p
b′
≻νp ν
p
b
∨
(8′)

pib ∼
pi
p pib′
ν
p
b ∼
ν
a ν
p
b′
νsb ≻
ν
a ν
s
b′
=⇒ up(pib, ν
s
b , ν
p
b
) > up(pib′ , ν
s
b′ , ν
p
b′
)
(9)
We highlight the fact that the three previously introduced agent types
can be used as atomic building blocks of this last type. Indeed, during
an exchange of messages, at each step, a curious and secretive agent acts
like one and only one canonical type. For instance, when comparing two
negotiations where (7′) (resp. (8′)) applies, its utility is similar to the one
of a secretive (resp. curious) agent. In the other numerous cases where
Equation (9) is not applicable, it can be abstracted to a secretive agent
each time it considers that the leaked information is more critical than the
collected one, as a curious each time it values more the collected information
than the revealed one, or as an uncurious if it estimates than the revealed
and collected information compensate each other.
4 Protocols for Curiosity-Proof Bargaining
To limit the impact of curious agents, we introduce and analyze variants of
the standard bargaining protocol.
We first analyze the different flaws of classical bargaining w.r.t. curious
agents and then introduce a curiosity-proof extension for each phase of the
protocol. Last, we theoretically analyze some induced incentives.
As described in Section 3.1, bargaining can be analyzed in term of three
aspects: (1) the agreement domains, (2) the sequence of proposals and (3)
the way the negotiation ends (accept or reject). Each of those aspects may
lead to situations with unnecessary leak of information, which may be ex-
ploited by curious agents.
The mutual agreement domain is the range of prices where a mutual
agreement can be found. If it is empty (the seller minimal price is
higher than the purchaser maximal price) the bargaining is not ac-
cepted: the revealing of information is useless. Furthermore, a curious
seller may decide of a reserve price much higher than its real one. If
the bargaining is concluded, it would collect information and sell the
good at a very high price, which is very good for it; otherwise it would
collect information for free.
The sequence of proposals is defined by the agent strategies and reserve
prices. Adopting strategies that make smartly chosen concessions can
increase the number of exchanges. Such strategies can be used by a
curious agent in order to optimize the collected information.
The negotiation issue (accept or reject) is also a crucial aspect. A cu-
rious agent gets a positive utility as soon as some proposals are done,
even if the negotiation ends with a reject. A contrario, in the case of a
reject, the utility of a secretive agent is negative. This puts the ratio
of power strongly in favor of the curious agents who may accept only
if the proposed price is really advantageous.
We now present a variant for each of the steps that aims to reduce
curiosity.
4.1 Description of the proposed modifications
Matching We first propose to avoid a useless leak of information result-
ing from bargaining between two parties that have incompatible agreement
domains. A trusted third-party collects the agents (initial) reserve prices
and authorizes the bargaining if and only if a mutual agreement is possible.
Bounds Secondly, we propose to bound the number of exchanges ; if no
agreement has been reached by the bound, the bargaining fails. The bound
associated to a bargaining b ∈ B is noted kmaxb . Gneezy et al. [10] shows
that this advantages the agent making the last proposal ; similarly to [21] we
rely on a trusted third-party which transmits the proposals simultaneously,
after both agents have made them.
Enforcing the execution of a transaction Lastly, we propose to pre-
vent the possible failure of a bargaining by enforcing the transaction even
if the deal has been rejected or the bound of proposals has been reached.
In this case, the good is exchanged at the agents reserve prices and the re-
maining money is taken by the community as a penalty. This transaction
is the less favorable for both parties and thus provides a strong incentive to
conclude all the deals.
4.2 Some proven properties
We now prove two properties about the incentives induced by our proposals.
First, Theorem 1 shows that the proposals provide a strong incentive, for
a purchaser (resp. seller), not to declare a too high (resp. too low) reserve
price. This means that, for instance, a curious agent will not lie on its
reserve price in order to match as many agents as possible and cancel the
negotiation after it has got enough information. Note that the question
of providing an incentive, for a purchaser (resp. seller) not to declare a
reserve price lower (resp. higher) than the real one is still open. Hence, it is
possible to manipulate the matching procedure in order to detect adversary
parties with advantageous reserve prices and with the guarantee of getting
a profitable deal.
Theorem 1. Suppose the agent considers that the amount of information
increases with the number of exchanged messages. Then, using the three
extensions gives a curious purchaser (resp. seller) an incentive to give a
reserve price inferior (resp. superior) to pipb (k
max
b ) (resp. pi
s
b(k
max
b )).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we suppose that our agent is a curious
purchaser pb. Let b be a bargaining (see Definition 1) between pb and a
seller sb. We prove that if the purchaser declares a more interesting price
(for the seller) than its reserve price computed at the bound, either it pays
more (case 1 and 2) or it is matched with the same seller as if it was honest
(case 3).
Case 1: pib = ⊥ , the deal is rejected. In this case, due to the third exten-
sion, the agent pays the price it has declared. Hence, the lower the
price, the better the deal. In particular, if the bound is reached, pb has
to pay price higher than its reserve price and gets a negative utility.
Case 2: pib ∈ R ∧ pib > pi
p
b (k
max
b ) , the bargaining is accepted, but pb pays
a price higher than his true reserve price. This case may arise if the
last proposal before the bound is higher than its true reserve price,
but lower than the declared one. It is then more interesting for pb
to accept the proposal than to reach the bound and pay the declared
reserve price. Such a situation can happen whether the seller has a
reserve price higher or lower than pipb (k
max
b ). In the first case, pb is
matched with an agent and would have not be matched with it if it
was honest, but it pays more than it wants; in the second it would
have been matched with this agent anyway.
Case 3: pib ∈ R ∧ pi
p
b (k
max
b ) ≥ pib , the bargaining is accepted at a price
lower than the true reserve price of pb. This is the only case where pb
gets a good at an acceptable price. However, assuming the seller hon-
esty, this can only occurs if the true reserve price of pb is compatible
with the reserve price of sb. Hence, sb would have been matched with
pb even if pb had been honest.
Theorem 2 shows that the proposals also provide a strong incentive to
find an agreement while negotiating.
Theorem 2. Rejecting an offer or going to a deadline is less interesting
for a couple of rational negotiating agents than finding any agreement more
advantageous than the declared reserve price, before the negotiation ends.
Proof. Suppose that the bargaining b failed. The utility of the purchaser
is up = (pi
matching
p , k
s
b , k
p
b
) where pimatchingp is the reserve price that the pur-
chaser has declared. According to Equation (5), p would prefer any situa-
tion with a success on a price inferior than pimatchingp . The same goes for the
seller.
5 Effect of the introduced extensions on the cu-
riosity
In this section we propose an empirical analysis of the impact of the intro-
duction of the proposed extensions. Our objective is to measure how an
inappropriate collect of information is restrained. Restraining the collect of
information without impacting the protocol performance ideally reduces the
welfare of curious agents, increases the one of secretive agents and does not
affect uncurious agents.
We first describe the experimental protocol. Then, we present empirical
results about the variation of the number of exchanged messages and the
agent welfare.
5.1 Experimental Protocol
Our experiments consist in running different instances of bargaining with
randomly generated couples of agents. A bargaining instance is identified
to the possible variants: standard bargaining, with matching, with a given
bound or with the three extensions altogether. The bound on the number
of messages, kmaxb , is set to 500. This value has been computed from a set of
experiments not presented here for reasons of space. It is the most advanta-
geous for secretive agents on our specific experimental context: below this
value, we observed that the bound strongly decreased their welfare, whereas
above this value it remained constant. The same phenomenon was observed
for uncurious and curious agents with, respectively, the values 750 and 1000.
Those values correspond to the point where most of the deals were already
ended.
An agent a is associated to a type (uncurious, curious or secretive), an
initial reserve price pia(0), a utility function ua, and a strategy function. The
utility function of the agent is represented2 in Equation (10). One can verify
2Only the utility of purchaser is given here, the utility of seller being similar
the validity of those functions (see Figure 1) w.r.t. Definitions 4 to 6 .
∀b ∈ B, ua(pib, ν
s
b , ν
p
b
) =
{
piba(0) ·∆(n)− pib if the negotiation succeeds
piba(0) · (∆(n)− 1) else
where 

∆(n) = 1 if a is uncurious
∆(n) =
1
logn(n + k
p
b )
if a is secretive
∆(n) = logn(n + k
p
b ) if a is curious
(10)
A strategy function indicates at each step the proposal the agent is will-
ing to make. If the other party makes a better proposal, the agent accepts
it. If the planned proposal is worse than the agent reserve price, the agent
drops off the bargaining. The used strategy is represented in Equation (11)
and is an adaptation of [8]. The parameters κa, βa and γa determine the
shape of the curve for agent a. An example is plotted in Figure 1.
γ +
(
κa + (1− κa) ·
(
k
kmaxa
) 1
βa
)
· (γa − pi
b
a) (11)
An experiment considers a couple of agents, defined by their type and
an instance of bargaining. The agent reserve prices have been drawn from a
Gaussian distribution and κa, βa and γa from uniform distributions. Each
experiment is averaged over 10’000 draws and we observe the final welfare
of each type of agent.
5.2 Impact on the welfare
Figure 2 displays the welfare of the different types of agents in different
settings. “barg” stands for standard bargaining, “mat.” for the matching
extension, “bou.” for the bounding extension (with a bound of 500 mes-
sages) and “all” for the three extensions all together.
Figure 2a shows how the proposed extensions affect the welfare of clas-
sical agents. Bounding slightly reduces their welfare (10%): it tends to
close the longest negotiations by rejects. A contrario, all others increase
noticeably their welfare. Matching doubles it by increasing the number of
successful negotiations. Applying all extensions quadruples it: the agents
make concessions more quickly in order to reach their reserve price before
the deadline (Theorem 2).
Figure 2b shows the impact on curious agents. First, we observe that
their welfare is worse when they negotiate with secretive agents rather than
uncurious ones. Indeed, secretive agents tend to drop off the bargaining
more often. Whatever the opponent, matching and applying all extensions
barg. matchbound all
0
2
4
W
el
fa
re
(a) Welfare of the uncurious agents,
uncurious vs uncurious
barg. matchbound all
0
2
4
6
W
el
fa
re
(b) Welfare of the curious agents
barg. matchbound all
−2
0
2
4
6
W
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fa
re
(c) Welfare of the secretive agents
* vs uncurious
secretive vs curious
Figure 2: Welfare of the agents in different situations
lower the welfare by a sixth since agents get to an agreement more quickly.
A contrario, using only bounding lowers the welfare by 10% when negoti-
ating with uncurious agents while it increases it by the same factor when
negotiating with secretive ones. Please note that (1) bounding alone results
in more reject, thus curious agents get more often information “for free”
and (2) curious agents might accept overpriced deal for the sake of infor-
mation collect. This last point is more critical when facing secretive agents
since they get more tough as the bargaining is going on. Consequently,
if they were to succeed, the deals rejected thanks to the bound would have
been more disadvantageous for curious agents when they are facing secretive
agents than with uncurious ones.
Figure 2c shows the impact of the extensions on secretive agents. Each
extension has a positive impact. Please note that the average welfare of
secretive agents is negative with the standard protocol because of the ne-
gotiations that end by a reject: secretive agents have revealed information
without counterpart. Matching limits considerably the number of rejects,
giving thus a positive welfare to them with nearly the same absolute value.
Bounding only slightly increases the welfare of secretive agents (its absolute
value is reduced by 9%) by reducing the number of exchanged messages
before a reject. Last, adding the enforcement of transaction results in a
really higher welfare (three times in absolute value) for the same reason as
uncurious agents. The welfare of secretive agents is always worse when they
negotiate with curious agents.
The extensions that we have introduced reach their goal by preventing
curiosity. Both matching agents on their reserve prices and forcing them
to make deals effectively make opponent modeling much harder. However,
bounding the number of exchanged messages alone is not very beneficial.
6 Conclusion and Perspectives
This article studied curiosity in bargaining. Curious agents exploit infor-
mation leaked during a bargaining in order to model their opponents and,
thus, gain a significant advantage in future bargaining. In order to reduce
it, we first introduced an original rationality model that considers the ex-
changed information. This led to the establishment of three types of agents:
uncurious agents that correspond to the classical agents – they do not con-
sider the exchanged information; secretive agents that are concerned by the
information they might unveil; and curious agents that seek for information
leaked by their opponents. We then proposed three extensions of the stan-
dard bargaining protocol both to limit the exchanged information and to
provide incentives to not seek it. Incentives have been studied theoretically
and the general impact of those extensions has been analyzed empirically.
Our experiments showed how strongly curiosity impacts the bargaining
process. Indeed, introduction of curious agents results in longer negotiation
and higher prices, while it is the contrary for secretive ones. Used simultane-
ously, our three extensions have proven to be really effective for preventing
agents from seeking information, assuming they declare their true intention.
However, this extended bargaining protocol can be manipulated by agents
that are willing to negotiate less often but in more favorable conditions.
We plan to enrich our proposal in future work by addressing this last
issue in the context of one-to-many negotiation. Indeed, the competitive
environment of, for instance, Iterated Contract Net Protocol would help to
deal with this issue.
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